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Summary findings
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache explore how a  situation at individual banks or in specific segments of
miultivariate logit empirical model of banking crisis  the banking sector - so crises that may develop from
probabilities can be used to monitor fragility in the  specific weaknesses in some market segments and spread
banking sector.  through contagion would not be detected.
The proposed approach relies on readily available  The econometric study of systemic banking crises is a
data, and the fragility assessment has a clear  relatively new field of study. The development and
interpretation based on in-sample statistics. Also, the  evaluation of monitoring  and forecasting tools based on
monitoring  system can be tailored to fit the preferences  the results of studies such as this are at an embryonic
of the decisionmakers, and the model has better in-  stage at best.
sample performance than currently available alternatives.  Demirgtii-Kunt and Detragiache highlight elements
Despite these advantages, the monitoring  system  that need to be evaluated in developing "ready-to-use"
would have missed the 1997 banking crises in Indonesia,  procedures for decision-makers and explore possible
Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea, while it would have  avenues for doing so.
derected some weakness in Thailand and the Philippines.  The monitoring system must be designed to fit the
It would have clearly foreseen the 1996 crisis in Jamaica.  needs of policymakers, so systems must be developed as
Aggregate variables can convey information  about  part of an interactive process involving both
general economic conditions often associated with  econometricians and decisionmakers.
fragility in the banking sector but are silent about the
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dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  ademirguckunt@worldbank.org  or
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1. Introduction
The last two decades  have seen  a proliferation  of systemic  banking  crises,  as
documented,  among  others,  by the comprehensive  studies  of Lindgren,  Garcia,  and Saal
(1996)  and Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996).  Most recently,  the economic  crises  experienced  by
five East Asian countries  (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  South Korea,  the Philippines,  and Thailand)
were accompanied  by deep financial  sector  problems.  While  in some  cases  the troubles  were
foreseen,  in others  most observers  (including  the Fund,  the Bank, and the major credit  rating
agencies)  were caught  by surprise. Similarly,  three years  earlier,  the Mexican  devaluation
and associated  banking  crisis  had caught  many observers  and market  participants  by surprise.
The spread  of banking  sector problems  and the difficulty  of anticipating  their
outbreak  have raised  the issue of improving  monitoring  capabilities  both at the national  and
supra-national  level, and, particularly,  of using statistical  studies  of past banking  crises  to
develop  a set of indicators  of the likelihood  of future problems.  In our previous  work
(Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache,  1998a  and 1998b),  we developed  an empirical  model  of
the determinants  of systemic  banking  crises  for a large  panel of countries.  Using a
multivariate  logit framework,  we estimated  the probability  of a banking  crisis as a function  of
various explanatory  variables.  That  research  showed  that there is a group of variables,
including  macroeconomic  variables,  characteristics  of the banking  sector,  and structural
characteristics  of the country,  that are robustly  correlated  with the emergence  of banking
sector crises.  This paper explores  how the information  contained  in that empirical
relationship  can be utilized  to monitor  banking  sector  fragility.2
The basic idea is to estimate  a specification  of the multivariate  logit model  used in our
previous  work that relies only on explanatory  variables  whose future  values are routinely
forecasted  by professional  forecasters,  the Fund, or the Bank. Out-of-sample  banking  crisis
probabilities  are then computed  using the estimated  coefficients  and forecasted  values of the
explanatory  variables.  Using the information  provided  by in-sarnple  estimation  result,  these
forecasted  probability  are used to make a quantitative  assessment  of fragility.  More
specifically,  we examine  two different  monitoring  frameworks:  in the first, the monitor  wants
to know whether  forecasted  probabilities  are high enough  to trigger  a response  or not. The
response  is defined  to be a costly action  of some  sort, for instance  gathering  new specific
information,  scheduling  on-site  bank inspections,  taking  preventive  regulatory  measures,  or
others.  Each possible  threshold  for taking action  has a cost in terms of type I error (failure  to
identify  a crisis) and type II error (false  alarm),  a cost that can be quantified  on the basis of
in-sample  classification  accuracy.  Naturally,  the choice  of the criterion  depends  on the cost of
either  type of error  to the monitor.  For instance,  if the monitoring  system is used as a
preliminary  screen  to determine  which cases  warrant  further  analysis,  then a system  that
tolerates  a fair amount  of type II errors  but incurs  few type I errors will be preferable  to one
that is likely  to miss a lot of crises.  Conversely,  if the "warning  system"  is used to put
pressure on country  authorities  to take drastic  policy  actions  to prevent  an impending
disaster,  then a more conservative  criterion  is desirable.  The framework  developed  here  will
be sufficiently  flexible  to accommodate  alternative  preferences  for the decision-maker,  and it
will make explicit  the costs and benefits  of alternative  criteria.
In the second  monitoring  framework  examined,  the monitor  is simply  interested  in
rating the fragility  of the banking  system.  Depending  on the rating, various  courses  of action3
may follow,  but these are not explicitly  modeled.  In this case,  it is desirable  for a rating  to
have a clear interpretation  in terms of crisis  probability,  so that different  ratings  can be
compared.  We examine  one such example.
As an illustration  of the monitoring  procedures  developed  in the first part of the
paper, in the second  part of the paper we compute  out-of-sample  banking  crisis  probabilities
for the six banking  crises  that occurred  in 1996-97,  namely  Jamaica  in 1996  and the five East
Asian crises in 1997.  To compute  these  probabilities,  we use forecasts  produced  in the first
part of the crisis  year  by professional  forecasters  (as reported  in Consensus  Forecasts)  and by
the Fund  through  its semi-annual  World Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  exercise.  ' For the Asian
countries,  these forecasts  do not predict  the large exchange  rate depreciations  that  occurred  in
the second  half of the year. The exercise  suggests  that failure  to predict the exchange  rate
collapse  and its immediate  consequences  would  have led a monitor  using our system  to
conclude  that there was no little of banking  sector  fragility  in Indonesia,  Korea,  and
Malaysia,  while some  signs of weakness  would  have been detected  for Thailand  and the
Philippines.  The Jamaican  crisis  would  have  been identified  quite clearly.
The paper  is organized  as follows:  the next section  will briefly  review  existing
literature  on banking system  fragility  indicators;  Section  III presents  an adapted  version  of
our empirical  model  of banking  crises.  Section  IV discusses  how out-of-sample  probability
1  Our strategy  was to use WEO  forecasts  only where  variables  were not available
from Consensus  Forecasts.  The latter  forecasts  are computed  as averages  of forecasts  by
several  market  participants.  Thus,  they should  better represent  the view prevailing  on the
market about economic  conditions  in East  Asia than the WEO,  which  reflects  the assessment
of the Fund alone.4
forecasts obtained from the model can be used to obtain an early warning system. Section V
contains an application to the crises of 1996-1997, while Section VI concludes.
II. The Literature
An extensive literature has reviewed episodes of banking crises around the world,
examining the developments leading up to the crisis as well as the policy response. This
work, while it does not directly address the issue of leading indicators of banking sector
problems, points to a number of variables that display "anomalous" behavior in the period
preceding the crises. For instance, Gavin and Hausman (1996) and Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1996) suggest that credit growth be used as an indicator of impending troubles, as
crises tend to be preceded by lending booms.  Mishkin (1994) highlights equity price
declines, while, in his analysis of Mexico's  1995 crisis, Calvo (1996) suggests that
monitoring the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves may be useful in
evaluating banking sector vulnerability to a currency crisis.
Honohan (1997) performs a more systematic evaluation of alternative indicators: he
uses a sample of 18 countries that experienced banking crises and 6 that did not. The crisis
countries are then divided into three groups (of equal size) according to the type of crisis
(macroeconomic, microeconomic, or related to the behavior of the government). The average
value of seven alternative indicators for the crisis countries is then compared with the average
for the control group of countries. This exercise shows that banking crises associated with
macroeconomic problems were characterized by a higher loan-to-deposit ratio, a higher
foreign borrowing-to-deposit ratio, and higher growth rate of credit. Also, a high level of
lending to the government and of central bank lending to the banking system were associated5
with crises related to government intervention. On the other hand, banking crises deemed to
be of microeconomic origin did not appear to be associated with abnormal behavior on the
part of the indicators examined in the study.
Rojas-Suarez (1998) proposes an approach based on bank level indicators, similar in
spirit to the CAMEL system used by U.S. regulators to identify problem banks. The author
argues that in emerging markets (particularly in Latin America), CAMEL indicators are not
good signals of bank strength, and that more information can be obtained by monitoring the
deposit interest rate, the spread between the lending and deposit rate, the rate of credit
growth, and the growth of interbank debt. Because these variables are to be measured against
the banking system average, however, this approach appears more adequate for identifying
weaknesses specific to individual banks rather than a situation of systemic fragility. Also, the
approach requires bank level information, which is often not readily available outside of
developed countries.
The most comprehensive effort to date to develop a set of early warning indicators for
banking crises (and for currency crises) is that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996),
subsequently refined in Kaminsky (1998). These studies examine the behavior of 15
macroeconomic indicators for a sample of 20 countries which experienced banking crises
during 1970-1995.2  The behavior of each indicator in the 24 months prior to the crisis is
contrasted with the behavior during "tranquil" times. A variable is deemed to signal a crisis if
at any time it crosses a particular threshold. If the signal is followed by a crisis within the
next 24 months, then it is considered correct; otherwise it is considered noise. The threshold
2 For a study of early warning indicators of currency crises, see also IMF (1998).6
for each variable is chosen to minimize the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio. The authors then
compare the performance of alternative indicators based on the associated type I and type II
errors, on the noise-to-signal ratio, and on the probability of a crisis occurring conditional on
a signal being issued. 3 The indicator with the lowest noise-to-signal ratio and the highest
probability of crisis conditional on the signal is the real exchange rate, followed by equity
prices and the money multiplier. These three indicators, however, have a large incidence of
type I error, as they fail to issue a signal in 73-79 percent of the observations during the 24
months preceding a crisis. The incidence of type II error, on the other hand, is much lower,
ranging between 8 and 9 percent. The variable with the lowest type I error is the real interest
rate, which signals in 30 percent of the pre-crisis observations. The high incidence of type I
error relative to type II error may not be a desirable feature of a warning system if the costs of
false alarms are small relatively to the costs of missing a crisis.
The approach chosen by Karninsky and Reinhart (1996) offers no systematic way of
combining the information contained in the various indicators, as these indicators are
examined one at a time. Presumably, the likelihood of a crisis is greater when several
indicators are signaling at the same time; on the other hand, if signals are conflicting, it is not
clear which of the indicators should be relied upon. Kaminsky (1998) addresses these
concerns by developing "composite" indexes, such as the number of indicators that cross the
threshold at any given time, or a weighted variant of that index, where each indicator is
weighted by its signal-to-noise ratio, so that more informative indicators receive more
3 Actually, the authors use an "adjusted"version of the noise-to-signal ratio, computed
as the ratio of the probability of type II error to one minus the probability of a type I error.7
weight. Preliminary results, however, indicate that the composite indicators perform worse
than the individual ones.
The approach developed in the following sections will allow the policy-maker to
choose a warning system that reflects the relative cost of type I and type II error, and it will
offer a natural way of combining the effect of various economic forces on banking sector
vulnerability. By making better use of all available information, the system will deliver lower
overall in-sample forecasting errors than those associated with individual indicators. Also, we
will examine a problem that is not addressed by Kaminsky and Reinhart, namely that of a
monitor who wishes to use informnation  contained in the statistical analysis of past crisis
episodes not just to "call" or "not call" a crisis, but to obtain a more nuanced assessment of
banking sector fragility.
III. Estimating In-Sample Banking Crisis Probabilities in a Multivariate Logit
Framework
The starting point of our analysis is an econometric model of the probability of a
systemic banking crisis. In previous work (Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache, 1  998a and
1  998b), we have estimated various alternative specifications of a logit regression for a large
sample of developing and developed countries, including both countries that experienced
banking crises and countries that did not. Details on sample selection, the construction of the
banking crisis variable, and the choice of explanatory variables can be found in our previous
papers. That work identifies a set of variables, including macroeconomic variables,
characteristics of the banking sector, and structural characteristics of the economy, that are
robustly correlated with the emergence of systemic banking crises.8
To form the basis of an easy-to-use monitoring system, the econometric model should
rely on data that is readily available, and, if it utilizes contemporaneous values of the
explanatory variables, it should use variables for which forecasts are routinely produced.
Accordingly, in this section we will present estimation results for a specification of our
empirical model that includes only variables available from the International Financial
Statistics or other publicly available data bases, and that are routinely forecasted by the Fund
in its bi-annual World Economic Outlook (WEO) exercise, or by professional forecasters as
reported by Consensus Forecasts.  As it turns out, this is not the specification that fits the data
the best. There is one important exception to this criterion, however: professional forecasts
for the nominal interest rate are not available for most countries in the sample, but excluding
the real interest rate from the regression would have meant losing a lot of explanatory power.
Thus, we decided to include the real interest rate in the regression, and use the real interest
rate at t-  1 as a "naive" forecast of the real interest rate at t in the out-of-sample forecast
exercise. The regression is estimated using a panel of 766 observations for 65 countries
during 1980-95.4  In this panel, 36 systemic banking crises were identified, so that crisis
observations make up 4.7 percent of the sample. Table 1 lists the crisis episodes. The set of
explanatory variables capturing macroeconomic conditions includes the rate of growth of real
GDP, the change in the terms of trade, the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate (relative
to the US$), the rate of inflation and the fiscal surplus as a share of GDP. The explanatory
variables capturing characteristics of the financial sector are the ratio of broad money to
4 Due to lack of data or breaks in the series, for some countries part of the sample
period may be excluded. Also, years in which banking crises are ongoing are excluded from
the sample.9
foreign exchange reserves and the rate of growth of bank credit lagged by two periods.
Finally, GDP per capita is used as a proxy of structural characteristics of the economy that
may be relevant to the well-functioning of the banking system, such as the quality of
prudential regulation and supervision, or the enforcement of laws and regulations.
The estimated coefficients of the logit regression are reported in Table 2. Low GDP
growth, a high real interest rate, high inflation, strong growth of bank credit in the past, and a
large ratio of broad money to reserves are all associated with a high probability of a banking
crisis. Exchange rate depreciation and the terms of trade variable, on the other hand, are not
significant. Interestingly, a large fiscal surplus appears to increase the probability of a
banking crisis (although the significance level is low), suggesting that moral hazard may be
more severe when the government's comfortable financial position may make a generous
bailout more likely (Dooley, 1996).
As an illustration of the results, Table 1 shows the estimated crisis probabilities for
the 36 episodes included in the sarnple. The probabilities range from a low of 1.1 percent for
Nigeria to a high of 99.9 percent for Israel. About 70 percent of the episodes have an
estimated probability of 4 percent or above, while only 17 percent have an estimated
probability of over 50 percent. Each crisis probability can also be broken down into its
various components, so that it is possible to understand which factors are contributing to
fragility, at least according to the model, in each particular episode.
The 1994 Mexican Crisis according to the empirical model
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the estimated crisis probability in Mexico in the
period leading up to the 1994 crisis. The probability exhibits a sharp increase in 1993, so it is10
particularly interesting to examine which factors account for such an increase.  Table 3
provides a breakdown of the factors that make up the crisis probability in 1992 and 1993
according to the econometric model. The estimated crisis probability in the two years is
reported in the last two rows of the table. The first column gives the percent change in each
explanatory variable between 1992 and 1993. The next two columns report the "weights"
given to each factor in 1993 and 1992, respectively. These weights are obtained by
multiplying the estimated regression coefficient of each variable with the corresponding
value of the variable. Negative weights indicate that the variable in question tended to
decrease the estimated crisis probability. The weights are useful in understanding the role
each factor plays in determining the overall crisis probability in a particular year; for
example, in 1993, high past credit growth, high real interest rates, and high inflation were the
main underlying reasons why the crisis probability was high in Mexico.
Of course, the factors that explain the level of crisis probability are not necessarily the
same factors that explain the change in this probability.  Therefore, the table also reports
change in factor weights between 1992 and 1993, and the corresponding change in crisis
probability. Because logit is non-linear the sum of the contribution of each variable does not
always add up to the total change in probability.  Looking at macro factors, one sees that
Mexico had a negative growth shock which increased the crisis probability significantly.
There was also a significant increase in real interest rates and a minor terms of trade shock.
At the same time, appreciation of the exchange rate, a lower inflation and a lower budget
surplus helped offset some of this increase.  Financial sector variables played a less important
role in explaining the overall increase in probability, slightly offsetting the impact of the
macro factors. Vulnerability of the financial system to capital outflows - measured by11
M2/reserves ratio - decreased slightly, leading to a 1 percent decrease in crisis probability.
Credit growth slowed down, leading to a 2 percent lower crisis probability. Finally, GDP per
capita- which we use as a proxy of institutional development- did not change significantly in
this period. Thus, decomposing the crisis probability helps understanding which factors
played a role in bringing about the crisis, at least according to the empirical model.
Out-of-sample probability forecasts
Because the purpose of monitoring is to obtain an assessment of future fragility, the
next step is to obtain forecasts of banking crisis probabilities. These can be easily obtained as
follows:  let P be a 1  xN vector containing  the N estimated  coefficients  of the logit  regression
reported  in Table 1, and let 7, be a Nx 1 vector  of out-of-sample  values  of the explanatory
variables for country i at date t. Of course, these values can be true forecasts, estimates of
past values, or simply data for countries/time periods not included in the sample. Then, the
out-of-sample probability of a banking crisis for country i at date t is
exp[z.t]
it  1 +exp[pz,j]
Once out-of-sample probabilities are computed, the question arises of how to interpret them:
is a 10 percent crisis probability high or low? Should a policy-maker undertake preventive
actions when faced with such a probability? Should a surveillance agency issue a warning?
The next section will address the issue of how to use the forecasted probabilities to monitor
banking sector fragility.12
IV. Building  An Early  Warning  System  Using  Estimated  Crisis  Probabilities
The first monitoring  framework  considered  is one in which, after forecast
probabilities  are obtained  as described  in the preceding  section,  the decision-maker  has to
choose  whether  the probability  is large  enough  to issue a warning.  This is the framework
implicit  in Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1996).  Issuing  a warning  will lead to some  type  of action,
perhaps  investment  in further  information  gathering,  such  as the acquisition  of bank-level
balance  sheet data, or discussions  with senior  bank managers,  bank supervisory  agencies  in
the country,  or other market  participants.  Alternatively,  the warning  may be thought  of as
leading  to preventive  policy  or regulatory  measures.  Naturally,  the premise  behind  the
warning  system  is that either  banking  crises can be prevented  or that their cost can be
substantially  reduced  if an accurate  advance  warning  is received  by the decision-maker.
The choice  of the threshold  for issuing  a warning  will generally  depend  on three
aspects:  first, the probability  of type  I and type II errors associated  with the threshold,  which,
assuming  that the sample  of past crises is representative  of future  crises, can be assessed  on
the basis of the in-sample  frequency  of the two errors.  Clearly,  the higher  the threshold  that
forecasted  probabilities  must cross  before a warning  is issued,  the higher will be the
probability  of a type I error and the lower  will be the probability  of a type II error,  and vice
versa. The second  parameter  on which  the choice  of the threshold  depends  is the
unconditional  probability  of a banking  crisis,  which can also be assessed  based on the in-
sample  frequency  of crisis  observations:  if crises  tend to be rare events,  then  the overall
likelihood  of making a type  I error is relatively  small,  and vice versa. Finally,  the third aspect
that affects  the choice of a warning  threshold  is the cost to the decision-maker  of taking
preventive  action  relative  to the cost of an unanticipated  banking  crisis.13
A Loss Function for the Decision-Maker
Based  on the above considerations,  a more formal  analysis  of the decision  process
behind  the choice  of a warning  system  may be stated as follows.  Let T be the threshold
chosen  by the decision-maker,  so that if the forecasted  probability  of a crisis for country  i at
time t exceeds  T, then the system  will issue  a warning.  Let p(T) denote  the probability  that
the system  will issue a warning,  and let e(T)  be the joint probability  that a crisis  will occur
and the system  issues no warning.  Further,  let cl be the cost of taking  preventive  actions  as a
result of having  received  a warning  signal, and let c2 be the additional  cost of a banking  crisis
if it is not anticipated  (if anticipating  a crisis  can prevent  it altogether,  than c2 is the entire
cost of the crisis).  Presumably,  cl is substantially  smaller  than c2 if further  information
gathering  can be relied  upon to provide  useful information,  and if the knowledge  that a crisis
is impending  allows  policy-makers  to take effective  preventive  measures.  Then,  a simple
linear  expected  loss function  for the decision-maker  may be defined  as follows:
L(T)Ep(Y)c,  +e(T)c2.
This expression  can be rewritten  using the notions  of type I and type II error.  Let a(T)  be the
type I error associated  with threshold  T (the probability  of not receiving  any  warning
conditional  on a crisis occunring),  and let b(T) be the probability  of a type II error (the
probability  of receiving  a warning  conditional  on no crisis  taking  place).  Also, let w denote
the (unconditional)  probability  of a crisis.  Then  the loss function  of the decision-maker  can
be rewritten  as14
L(T) =c [(1 -a(T))w  +b(T)(l -w)]  +c2a(T)w =wc [  1  +(  c2-c)a(T)  +b(  l-
Cl  W
The second part of the equality above shows that the higher is the cost of missing a crisis
relative to the cost of taking preventive action (the larger is c2 relative to cl), the more
concerned the decision-maker will be about type I error relative to type II error, and vice
versa. Also, the higher is the unconditional probability of a banking crises (measured by the
parameter w), the more weight the decision-maker will place on type II errors, as the
frequency of false alarms is greater when crises tend to be rare events. Notice also that
minimizing  the noise-to-signal ratio (in our notation, b(T)/(1 -a(T)) -- the criterion chosen by
Kaminsky and Reinhart to construct and rank alternative signals -- does not generally lead to
minimizing the expected loss function specified above.
Using in-sample frequencies as estimates of the true parameters, the parameter w
should be equal to the frequency of banking crises in the sample, namely 0.047. The
functions a(T) and b(T), that trace how error probabilities change with the threshold for
issuing warnings, can be obtained from the in-sample estimation results as follows: given a
threshold of -- say -- T = 0.05, we can obtain a(0.05), i.e. the associated probability of type I
error, as the percentage of banking crises in the sample with an estimated crisis probability
below 0.05. Similarly, b(O.05),  the probability of issuing a warning when no crisis occurs, is
the percentage of non-crisis observations with an estimated probability of crisis above 0.05.
Figure 2 shows the functions a(T) and b(T) for T E [0, 1] computed from the estimation
results of Section III above. Of course, a(T) is increasing, as the probability of not issuing a
warning when a crisis occurs increases as the threshold rises, while b(T) is decreasing. The15
two functions cross at T =  0.036, where the probabilities of either type of error is about 30
percent.
Figure 2 also shows that crisis probabilities estimated through our multivariate logit
framework can provide a more accurate basis for an early warning system than the indicators
developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996): as discussed in section II above, the indicator
of banking crises associated with the lowest type I error in the Kaminsky-Reinhart
framework is the real interest rate, with a type I error of 70 percent and a type II error of 19
percent. With our model, as shown in Figure 2, a threshold for type I error of slightly over 70
percent (72 percent, to be precise) comes at the cost of a type II error of only 1.2 percent.
Similarly, the best indicator of banking crises according to Kamninsky  and Reinhart is the real
exchange rate, with a type I error of 73 percent and a type II error of 8 percent (resulting in an
adjusted noise-to-signal ratio of 0.30). With our model, a type II error of 7.4 percent can be
obtained by choosing a probability threshold of 0.09, and it is associated with a type I error of
only 53 percent, resulting in an adjusted noise-to-signal ratio of 0.25. We conjecture that the
better performance of the multivariate logit model stems from its ability to combine into one
number (the estimated crisis probability) all the information provided by the various
economic variables monitored.
Choosing the Optimal Threshold
By way of illustration, we have computed loss functions for three alternative
configurations of the cost paramneters  of the decision-maker. The cost of taking further action
as a result of a warning cl is normalized to 1 in all three scenarios, while the cost of suffering
an unanticipated crisis C2 takes the values 20, 10, and 5 respectively. The three resulting loss16
functions are plotted in Figure 3V The values of the warning threshold that minimize the loss
functions are, respectively, T=0.034, T=0.09, and T=0.20. In other words, a decision-maker
whose cost of missing a crisis is 10 times the cost of taking precautionary measures would
issue an alarm every time the forecasted probability of crisis exceeds 9 percent, and similarly
for the other cases. Thus, as expected, as the cost of missing a crisis increases relatively to the
cost of taking preventive action, the optimal threshold of the warning system falls, resulting
in a warning system with fewer type I errors and more type II errors.
Figure 4 shows the optimal probability threshold for a broad range of values of the
parameter c2 , namely c2 E [2, 40], while cl is kept constant at 1. For values of c2 between 40
and 15 the optimal probability threshold for issuing a warning is T = 0.034. With this
criterion, the probability of not issuing a warning when a crisis occurs is about 14 percent,
while the probability of mistakenly issuing a warning is 31 percent. As c2 declines below 15,
the threshold increases to 0.09 (type I error of 50 percent, and type II error of 7.4 percent),
and remains there until C2 reaches 8. At this point, the threshold jumps to 0.20, as the
decision-makers is very concerned about false alarms. Finally, if the cost of missing a crisis
is as low as 2-3 times that of issuing a false warning, then the optimal threshold is 0.30,
corresponding to a type I error as high as 72.2 percent and a type II error as low as 1.2
percent.
To fully appreciate the nature of the warning system, it is worth pointing out that the
probability of a type I error is not the probability of missing a crisis. To obtain the probability
of missing a crisis, the probability of a type I error must be multiplied by the unconditional
5 To keep the image sufficiently clear in the relevant range, we have omitted values of
the loss functions for T > 0.30. The functions continue to increase in the omitted range.17
probability of a crisis, which in our sample is 0.047. Similarly, the probability of issuing a
wrong warning is the size of the type II error times the frequency of non-crisis observations.
With a threshold of T=0.09, the probability of missing a crisis is, therefore, only 2.3 percent,
since crises occur rarely. In contrast, the probability of receiving a false alarm is 7.1 percent,
because non-crisis observations tend to be the majority.
So, based on our framework for forecasting crisis probabilities, warning systems
associated with a relatively low incidence of type I error (below 15 percent) give rise to a
fairly large amount of false alarms, in part because crises tend to be infrequent events. If the
system is used as a preliminary screen, and further information gathering can provide a an
effective way to sort out cases in which the banking system is sufficiently sound, then the
decision-maker would be willing to accept the high incidence of type II error.  It should also
be pointed out that, in some cases, what is considered a false alarm by the model may
actually be a useful signal. To illustrate this point, we have examined the "false
alarms"generated in-sample by a threshold of 0.047. As it turns out, in 21 cases the "false
positives" were observations in the two years immediately preceding a crisis, suggesting that
the conditions that eventually led to a full-fledged crisis were in place (and were detectable) a
few years in advance.  In other cases, the "false alarms" may have corresponded to episodes
of fragility that were not sufficiently severe to be classified as full-fledged crises in our
empirical study, or where a crisis was prevented by a prompt policy response. Thus, an
assessment of the accuracy of the warning system based on in-sample classification accuracy
may exaggerate the incidence of type II errors. On the other hand, as usual, out-of-sample
predictions are subject to additional sources of error relative to in-sample prediction: the
forecasted values of the explanatory variables include forecast errors, and there may be18
structural breaks in the relationship between banking sector fragility and the explanatory
variables which make predictions based on past behavior inadequate. Also, despite the large
size of our panel, the number of systemic banking crises in the sample (36) is still relatively
small, so that small sample problems may affect the estimation results. Obviously, as more
data become available and the size of the panel is extended, this problem should become less
severe.
V. Using Estimated Crisis Probabilities to Construct a Rating System for Bank
Fragility
In this section, we consider the problem of a monitor whose task is to rate the fragility
of a given banking system. The rating will then be used by other agents to decide on a
possible policy response, but the monitor is not necessarily aware of the costs and benefits of
such policy actions. In this case, it seems desirable for the rating system to have a clear
interpretation in terms of type I and type II error. This has two advantages: first, agents who
learn the rating can do their own cost/benefit calculations when they decide whether or not to
take action; second, the fragility of two systems that are assigned two different ratings can be
compared based on a clear metric.
The starting point for constructing the rating system is once again the set of forecasted
crisis probabilities obtained using the coefficients estimated in the multivariate logit
regression of Section III above. Clearly, a country with a forecasted probability of x should
be deemed more fragile than one with an estimated probability of y<x. To establish fragility
"classes", one can partition the interval [0, 1], which is the set of possible forecasted crisis
probabilities, into a number of subintervals, and assign a rating to all estimated probabilities19
within a given class. Obviously, there are no objective criteria for choosing one particular
partition, but a number of considerations help narrowing down partitions that may be useful.
First, because the frequency of crises in the sample is small, choosing fine partitions would
give rise to misleading results, because there would be many classes with no observed crises
in them. For instance, as shown by the flat section of the type I error curve in Figure 2, in our
sample there are no crises episodes with an estimated crisis probability between 4 and 5
percent. On the other hand, there are episodes with an estimated probability between 3 and 4
percent. If we choose one of the classes to be the interval [0.04-0.05] and the other the
interval [0.03, 0.04], then it would appear that fragility decreases with the estimated crisis
probability, an obviously misleading conclusion. Thus, due to the small number of crises
relative to sample observations, only fairly coarse partitions will give rise to sensible results.
Another caveat is that the empirical distribution of the estimated probabilities is strongly
skewed towards zero: only 8.5 percent of the observations have probabilities larger than 10
percent, and over 45 percent are in the 0-2 percent range. Thus, partitioning the unit interval
by subsets of the same size would result in a very uneven number of observations belonging
to each class, with very few observations in the highest probability intervals.
Based on these considerations, we have constructed an example of a rating system
with four fragility classes (Table 4). The system uses "intuitive" thresholds of type I error to
determine the upper bound of each class. More specifically, the upper bounds of each of the
four classes have been chosen so that the type I error associated with the bounds are 10
percent, 30 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent respectively.  What this means is that, if one
were to classify as crises all observations in classes higher than the first, the probability of
missing a crisis would be less than or equal to 10 percent. To put it differently, 90 percent of20
the crisis observations have a probability higher than the probabilities in the first class, and
similarly for the other classes. The upper bounds of the four classes are 0.018, 0.036, 0.07,
and 1. The table also reports the type II error associated with the upper bound of each class.
These values are (about) 60 percent, 30 percent, 12 percent, and zero respectively. As an
additional indicator of fragility, we have computed the fraction of estimated observations in
the class that corresponds to an actual banking crisis. This measure goes from 1.5 percent for
the lowest fragility class to 16.8 percent for the highest.  As an illustration of the rating
system just described, Table 5 shows how the 36 in-sample banking crises would have been
classified according to the system.
Clearly, these rating systems are just examples of many possible alternatives, and
depending on the purposes of the monitor one alternative may be preferable to the other.
What is important is that the meaning of the fragility score and the criteria used in rating be
made clear to potential users.
VI. An Application to the Banking Crises of 1996-1997
As an illustration of the performance of the monitoring mechanisms developed in the
preceding sections, we consider how the system would have fared in relation to the six
banking crises that took place in 1996-97, that is after the end of the sample period used in
the estimation exercise of Section III above. The six banking crises took place in Jamaica in
1996, and Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1997. Early accounts
and analyses of the events surrounding the five Asian crises can be found, for instance, in
IMF (1997), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Goldstein and Hawkins (1998).21
To compute out-of-sample banking crisis probabilities for the six countries in 1996
and 1997 we use two alternative sets of values for the explanatory variables. The first set
consists of the latest available data. The out-of-sample probabilities obtained in this way are
not true forecasts, of course. In particular, for the five Asian countries these figures reflect the
large exchange rate depreciations that took place in the second half of 1997 and their
immediate consequences. Since these events were largely unanticipated by observers, it is of
interest to try to assess whether signs of increasing banking sector fragility would have been
apparent before the depreciations took place. To this end, and, more generally, to assess the
performance of the monitoring system when true forecasts are used, we also compute out-of-
sample crisis probabilities using forecasts of the explanatory variables as of May 1997.
Comparison between the two forecasts will show to what extent errors in forecasting
explanatory variables would have clouded the fragility assessment based on our model. The
forecasted values of the explanatory variables are taken, where available, from Consensus
Forecasts. This publication surveys several prominent private sector forecasters; the
"consensus forecast" is the average of the forecasts obtained from the survey, and it is the
number used in our calculations. For the five Asian countries, growth rates of real GDP,
inflation, short-term interest rates, and broad money (M2) are obtained from Consensus
Forecasts. The remaining values (and all of the values for Jamaica) come from the May 1997
WEO data base of the Fund. 6 To compute out-of-sample crisis probabilities using the most
6 There are a three exceptions to the above-mentioned criteria: for the Philippines,
broad money comes from the WEO. For Korea, no forecast of reserves was available, so we
arbitrarily assumed reserves to return to their 1995 value in 1997. Also, no forecast was
available for the short-term interest rate in the Philippines, so we assumed it to remain
constant in real terms.22
recent data for the explanatory variables, we have used IFS numbers when available, and
WEO February 1998 numbers otherwise.
Figure 5 shows estimated crisis probabilities for the 6 countries in 1990-1995, as well
as probability forecasts for 1996-97. The two lines for 1996 and 1997 correspond to the two
alternative sets of explanatory variables, May 1997 forecasts and February 1998 estimates. 7
To give a fragility assessment based on these probabilities, we have chosen the rating system
of Table 4 (see Section V above). The horizontal lines in the figures mark the boundaries
between each of the four fragility classes, corresponding to fragility rating (type I error) of 10
percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent respectively. To shed further light on the determinants of
the levels and changes in each estimated probability, Tables 6-11 present the decomposition
of the probability (using both forecasted and actual data) in the year before the crisis and in
the year of the crisis for each of the six episodes. The tables are built using the same method
used in the analysis of the Mexican 1994 crisis in Section III above.
As shown in Figure 5, based on forecasts as of May 1997 estimated crises
probabilities were relatively low for the five Asian countries, while Jamaica was well into the
highest fragility zone as early as 1995. This is not surprising, since all the Asian countries
had a very good macroeconomic performance in the years up to  1996, a performance that, by-
and-large, was expected to continue. In Jamaica, the forecasted crisis probability was 14
percent in 1995 and 12.80 percent in 1996. In both years, the two main factors leading to
banking sector fragility were high real interest rates accompanied by high inflation (Table 6).
Strong past credit growth and a favorable fiscal position also contributed to fragility in 1995,
7 The differences between "forecasted" and "actual" figures for 1996 are due to
revisions of 1996 data in the February 1998 WEO.23
but not in 1996. The two most fragile Asian countries were Thailand and the Philippines,
with a forecasted crisis probability of about 3.5 percent in 1997. This would have placed the
two countries on the borderline between the second and third fragility zone based on our
rating system. In Thailand, the main factor contributing to bank fragility both in 1996 and in
1997 was the high level of the real interest rate, while strong past credit growth was also a
factor (Table 6). In contrast with Jamaica, however, where GDP growth was lackluster, in
Thailand the large predicted rate of growth of GDP worked as an offsetting factor, keeping
the overall crisis probability relatively small. In the Philippines, the predicted probability
increased over twenty percent between 1996 and 1997, mainly due to the high rate of growth
of credit two years earlier (Table 7). The real interest rate was lower than in Thailand, but so
was GDP growth. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea all had forecasted crisis probabilities
below 3 percent both in 1996 and in 1997 and would have been placed in the second fragility
class (actually, Malaysia would have even received the lowest fragility rating in 1996). As in
the other two Asian countries, the expectation of continued stability of the exchange rate and,
especially, of continued strong GDP growth more than offset the elements of fragility coming
from high real interest rates (not, however, in Korea) and strong past credit expansion. In
Indonesia, the relatively high rate of inflation also tended to increase bank fragility.
Not surprisingly, the picture obtained by estimating crises probabilities using the
latest available data would have been quite different for the five Asian countries, while for
Jamaica no striking dissimilarities emerge. Estimated crises probabilities are in the highest
fragility class for Indonesia and Thailand, and in the second highest for the other three24
countries. Malaysia, with a probability of 3.7 percent, appears to be the least fragile. 8 The
decomposition of the probability tells some interesting stories: first, of course, the exchange
rate depreciation had an important direct effect on fragility in all five countries. On the other
hand, in 1997 inflation was not much higher than forecasted, so it was not among the main
factors contributing to increased banking system vulnerability according to our model.
Similarly, increases in the ratio of M2 to reserves due to losses in reserves did not play an
important role. In all five countries except Korea lower-than-forecasted GDP growth was one
of the main contributing factors, and so was the higher-than-expected real interest rate
(except in Thailand).
To summarize, an analysis of banking system fragility using the methods developed
in this paper would have clearly indicated an impending banking crisis in Jamaica; while
signs of fragility were present in Thailand and the Philippines, the overall image of the five
Asian economies would have been a rather reassuring one, as expectations of continued
strong economic growth and stable exchange rates would have offset the negative impact of
relatively high real interest rates and strong past credit expansion.
IV. Conclusions
The recent proliferation of systemic banking sector problems accompanied in many
cases with severe economic disruption has prompted a call for improving the monitoring
capabilities of both the Fund and the Bank. As part of this effort, this paper has examined
how the statistical analysis of past systemic banking crises can be used to construct
8 Of the five Asian countries, Malaysia is the only one without an IMF program so
far.25
monitoring tools that may be used to complement more qualitative assessments of banking
sector weaknesses. On this subject, it should be emphasized that the analysis contained in the
paper relies solely on aggregate data. This is an advantage, because such data is readily
available for a large number of countries, and the variables used to compute the fragility
measures are routinely forecasted by professional forecasters, the Fund, or the Bank. On the
other hand, while aggregate variables can convey information about the general economic
conditions that tend to be associated with banking sector fragility, they are silent about the
situation at individual banks or in specific segments of the banking sector, so crises that may
develop from specific weaknesses in some market segments and spread through contagion
would not be detected.
The first monitoring tool explored is an "early warning system", namely a system that
will issue a signal in case the likelihood of a crisis exceeds a certain threshold. In our
approach, the likelihood of a crisis is the forecasted crisis probability constructed using
coefficients estimated through a multivariate logit model. This probability, therefore, reflects
the combined effect of the predicted behavior of a number of economic variables that were
significantly correlated with the emergence of past banking crises. The appropriate threshold
for issuing a warning must be chosen based on the costs of missing a crisis and the benefits
of avoiding false alarms. These costs and benefits depend on the preferences of the decision-
maker, as well as on the actions that will be triggered by the warning. The second monitoring
tool developed in the paper is a rating system for bank fragility.  In this case, forecasted crisis
probabilities are used to classify a particular banking system in one of a few fragility classes.
Each fragility class is constructed so that it has a clear interpretation in terms of the26
likelihood of a crisis, and the fragility level of different classes can be compared based on a
well-defined metric.
The evaluation of banking sector fragility performed along these lines is subject to
several potential errors common to all exercises based on forecasts: first, the regression
coefficients used to compute crisis probability forecasts are only estimates of the true
parameters. Second, new crises may be of a different nature than those experienced in the
past, so that the coefficients derived from in-sample estimation may be of limited use out of
sample. The latter problem may be particularly severe since banking crises tend to be rare
events, and, even though the panel used for in-sample estimation is quite large (766
observations), crisis episodes only number 36. The third source of errors is that forecasts of
the explanatory variables are likely to incorporate forecast errors, as vividly illustrated by the
example of the five recent Asian crises. Large forecast errors, in turn, may severely distort
the fragility assessment resulting from our procedures.
One way to reduce the impact of forecast errors is to develop alternative scenarios for
the explanatory variables, and to examine banking sector fragility in the context of such
scenarios. This would seem particularly useful, because in many cases banking crises are
triggered by "extreme" behavior in one or more explanatory variables (a currency collapse, a
bout of inflation, a drastic deterioration in the terms of trade) in a context in which other
elements also contribute to overall fragility. Routine forecasts of economic variables usually
do not encompass extreme events of this sort, which, instead, tend to be discussed as "risk
elements" of the overall picture. The framework used here would lend itself quite easily to
the evaluation of fragility in alternative scenarios, as the contribution of each individual
explanatory variable to the forecasted crisis probability can be clearly isolated.27
Another direction in which this work needs to be extended is to explore alternative
model specifications, and compare them from the point of view of their usefulness for
forecasting (see, for instance, Diebold, 1997). Here we have used a specification developed in
our previous work after eliminating explanatory variables for which forecasts were not
readily available. It could be that an even more parsimonious specification is more suitable
for forecasting purposes. We leave this issue to future extensions.
The econometric study of systemic banking crises is a relatively new field of study,
and the development and evaluation of monitoring and forecasting tools based on the results
of those studies is at an embryonic stage at best. The purpose of this paper has been not so
much to propose one or more "ready-to-use" procedures for decision-makers, but rather to
highlight what elements need to be evaluated in developing such procedures, and to explore
some possible avenues. One of the messages from this exercise is that the monitoring system
must be designed to fit the needs of policy-makers, and so the development of a system must
be the outcome of an interactive process that involves both econometricians and decision-
makers.28
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Table 1. Banking Crises and Estimated Crisis Probabilities
Crisis year  Estimated Probability
Chile  1981  .231
Colombia  1982  .066
Ecuador  1995  .439
Finland  1991  .066
Guyana  1993  .007
Indonesia  1992  .107
India  1991  .069
Israel  1983  .999
Italy  1990  .015
Jordan  1989  .334
Japan  1992  .037
Kenya  1993  .361
Sri Lanka  1989  .036
Mexico  1982  .527
1994  .099
Mali  1987  .035
Malaysia  1985  .067
Nigeria  1991  .011
Norway  1987  .036
Nepal  1988  .018
Panama  1988  .539
Peru  1983  .244
Philippines  1981  .035
PapuaNew  Guinea  1989  .121
Portugal  1986  .064
El Salvador  1989  .055
Sweden  1990  .036
Swaziland  1995  .633
Thailand  1983  .027
Turkey  1991  .158
1994  .482
Tanzania  1988  .035
Uruguay  1981  .329
United States  1980  .238
Venezuela  1993  .494
South Africa  1985  .19631
Table 2.  Banking Crisis Probabilities-- Logit Regression Resultst
EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES  ESTIMATED  COEFFICIENTS
Growth  -.172***
(.034)












Credit growthI 2 .015**
(.008)
GDP  per capita  -.039
(.033)
No. of Crises  36
No. of Obs.  766
model  X 2 61.46***
AIC  249
t Standard errors in parentheses, *, **  and ***  indicate significance levels of 15, 10, 5
and 1 percent respectively.32
Table 3
Decomposition of Estimated Banking Crisis Probability
Mexico, 1992-93
Percentage  Weight  Weight  in  Change  in  Contribution
Explanatory  variable  change  in  in 1993  1992  weight,  to percentage
variable,  1992-93  change  in
1992-93  probability
GDP  growth  -125  0.154  -0.624  0.778  105
Terms  of Trade  -16  -0.034  -0.041  0.007  1
Depreciation  -119  -0.002  0.010  -0.012  -1
Real interest  rate  386  0.327  0.067  0.259  28
Inflation  -31  0.202  0.295  -0.093  -8
Fiscal  surplus/GDP  -79  0.022  0.102  -0.080  -7
M2/reserves  -16  0.057  0.068  -0.011  -1
Lagged  credit growth  -4  0.498  0.517  -0.019  -2






A Rating  System  for Banldng  Sector  Fragility
Class  Probability  Type  I  Type II  No. of  Crises/
Interval  error  error  observations  observations
I  0-0.018  0-0.10  1-0.60  291  0.01
II  0.018-0.036  0.10-0.30  0.60-0.30  232  0.03
III  0.036-0.07  0.30-0.50  0.30-0.12  136  0.05
IV  0.07-1  0.50-1  0.12-0  107  0.1734
Table  5
In-Sample  Crises  Classified  According  to the Fragility  Rating System
Fragility  Class  Crisis Episode
I  Guyana,  Italy,  Nigeria,  Nepal
II  Philippines,  Mali, Sri Lanka,  Norway,
Sweden,  Thailand,  Tanzania
III  Colombia,  Finland,  India, Japan,
Malaysia,  Portugal,  El Salvador
IV  Chile,  Ecuador,  Indonesia,  Israel, Jordan,
Kenya, Mexico 1982,  Mexico  1994,
Panama,  Peru,  Papua  New Guinea,
Swaziland,  Turkey  1991,  Turkey 1994,
United States,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  South
Africa.35
Table  6
Decomposition  of Estimated  Banking  Crisis  Probability
Jamaica,  1995-96
Percentage  Weight  Weight  in  Weight  Contribution  to
change  in  in 1996  1995  change,  percentage
Explanatory  variable  variable,  1995-96  change  in
1995-96  probability
Forecasts
GDP  growth  -100  0  -0.086  0.086  8
Terms  of Trade  -40  -0.016  -0.027  0.011  1
Depreciation  -100  0  0.127  -0.127  -10
Real interest  rate  0  0.512  0.512  0  0
Inflation  -19  0.321  0.399  -0.077  -6
Fiscal  surplus/GDP  -211  -0.272  0.246  -0.518  -37
M2/reserves  41  0.049  0.035  0.014  1
Lagged  credit  growth  -178  -0.179  0.230  -0.409  -30






GDP  growth  -100  0  -0.086  0.086  8
Terms of Trade  -43  -0.16  -0.027  0.011  1
Depreciation  -113  -0.16  0.127  -0.143  -12
Real interest rate  +155  1.303  0.512  0.791  90
Inflation  -10  0.360  0.399  -0.039  -3
Fiscal surplus/GDP  -293  -.385  0.199  -0.584  -41
M2/reserves  -29  0.033  0.046  -0.013  -1
Lagged credit growth  -178  -0.180  0.230  -0.410  -30










vaiable,  Weight  Weight  in  Weight  Contribution  to
Explanatory  variable  1996-97  in 1997  1996  change,  percentage
199697  change in
probability
Foreat
GDP  growth  -4  -1.289  -1.341  0.052  5
Tenns of Trde  -83  4.005  -0.031  0.025  3
Depreciation  -31  0.016  0.026  -0.008  -1
Real interest  rate  -27  0.353  0.480  -0.127  -12
Inflation  -15  0.135  0.160  -0.024  -2
Fiscal surplus/GDP  -53  0.015  0.032  -0.017  -2
M2/reserves  7  0.086  0.080  0.005  0
Lagged  credit  growth  -14  0.184  0.213  -0.029  -3






GDP growth  -37  -0.859  -1.370  0.511  65
Terms  of Trade  -290  0.020  -0.010  0.030  3
Depreciation  135  0.599  0.016  0.583  76
Real  interest  rate  170  1233  0.353  0.880  134
Inflation  3  0.177  0.172  0.005  1
Fiscal  surplus/GDP  -53  0.01S  0.032  -0.017  -I
M2/reserves  -33  0.066  0.098  -0.032  -3
Lagged  credit growth  -14  0.184  0.213  -0.029  -3










variable,  Weight  Weight in  Weight  Contribution to
Explanatory variable  1996-97  in 1997  1996  change,  percentage
1996-97  change in
probability
Forecasts
GDP growth  -24  -0.928  -1.220  0.292  33
Terms of Trade  77  0.037  0.158  -0.122  -11
Depreciation  111  0.060  0.028  0.031  3
Realinterestrate  0  0.104  0  0.104  11
Inflation  -8  0.093  0.101  -0.008  -1
Fiscal surplus/GDP  0  0.066  0.066  0  0
M2/reserves  12  0.092  0.082  0.010  1
Lagged credit growth  -27  0.147  0.201  -0.054  -5






GDP growth  -16  -1.035  -1.229  0.194  21
Terns  of Trade  8  0.147  0.159  -0.012  -I
Depreciation  1037  0.670  0.059  0.611  81
Real interest rate  94  0.201  0.104  0.097  10
Inflation  -13  0.060  0.069  -0.009  -1
Fiscal surplus/GDP  0  0.066  0.066  0  0
M2/reserves  -28  0.068  0.094  -0.027  -3
Lagged credit growth  -27  0.147  0.201  -0.054  -5










variable,  Weight  Weight in  Weight  Contribution to
Explanatory variable  1996-97  in 1997  1996  change,  percentage
1996-97  change in
probability
Forecasts
GDP growth  -2  -1.375  -1.409  0.034  3
Terms of Trade  -108  0.003  -0.038  0.041  4
Depreciation  -199  -0.005  0  -0.010  -1
Real interest rate  -46  0.137  0.253  -0.116  -11
Inflation  0  0.070  0.071  0  0
Fiscal surplus/GDP  279  0.067  -0.037  0.104  11
M2/reserves  10  0.051  0.046  0.005  0
Lagged credit growth  150  0.370  0.148  0.222  24






GDP growth  -18  -1.204  -1.461  0.256  29
Terms of Trade  -47  -0.026  -0.050  0.024  2
Depreciation  134  0.354  -0.003  0.357  42
Real interest rate  170  0.370  0.137  0.233  25
Inflation  -39  0.064  0.105  -0.040  -4
Fiscal surplus/GDP  279  0.067  -0.037  0.104  it
M2/reserves  -10  0.072  0.079  -0.001  -1
Lagged credit growth  150  0.370  0.148  0.222  24










variable,  Weight  Weight  in  Weight  Contribution  to
Explanatory  variable  1996-97  in 1997  1996  change,  percentage
1996-97  change  in
probability
Forecasts
GDP  growth  11  -1.086  -0.945  -1.140  -13
Terms  of Trade  -70  -0.011  -0.037  0.026  3
Depreciation  132  0.035  0.015  0.020  2
Real interest  rate  -14  0.216  0.253  -0.037  -3
Inflation  -21  0.133  0.170  -0.036  3
Fiscal surplus/GDP  54  -0.013  -0.029  0.015  2
M2/reserves  -13  0.038  0.043  -0.005  -1
Lagged  credit growth  135  0.534  0.228  0.306  35






GDP  growth  -25  -0.736  -0.987  0.251  28
Terms  of Trade  -70  -0.011  -0.037  0.026  3
Depreciation  524  0.082  0.013  0.069  7
Real interest  rate  79  0.388  0.216  0.172  18
Inflation  -23  0.139  0.182  -0.043  -4
Fiscal surplus/GDP  54  -0.013  -0.029  0.016  2
M2/reserves  27  0.065  0.051  0.014  2
Lagged  credit growth  136  0.534  0.228  0.306  35










variable,  Weight  Weight  in  Weight  Contribution  to
Explanatory  variable  1996-97  in 1997  1996  change,  percentage
1996-97  change  in
probability
Forecasts
GDP  growth  -16  -0.960  -1.148  0.188  20
Terms  of Trade  86  0.008  0.055  -0.047  -4
Depreciation  293  0.006  -0.003  0.008  1
Real interest  rate  -11  0.352  0.395  -0.044  -4
Inflation  -25  0.089  0.119  -0.030  -3
Fiscal surplus/GDP  -55  0.065  0.145  -0.080  -7
M2/reserves  3  0.051  0.049  0.001  0
Lagged  credit  growth  -26  0.278  0.377  -0.099  -9






GDP growth  -91  -0.099  -1.100  1.001  157
Terms  of Trade  -3196  0.033  -0.001  0.034  3
Depreciation  4688  0.564  0.012  0.552  69
Real interest  rate  19  0.420  0.352  0.069  7
Inflation  19  0.122  0.103  0.019  2
Fiscal surplus/GDP  -55  0.065  0.146  -0.080  -7
M2/reserves  -15  0.050  0.059  -0.009  -I
Lagged  credit growth  -26  0.280  0.377  -0.099  -9
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0.5  4-  Type  I error
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Figure 5d. Malaysia  Figure 5e. Philippines  Figure  5f. Thailand
0.18  0.18  0.18
0.16  0.16  0.16
0.14  0.14  0.14
0.12  0.12  0,12
0.1  0.1  0.1
0.08  0.08  .
°O  o64  . _ . _  ._ . 0 o46  \  ac.  0 °06  0.08  actual
0.06  .400
actual  .0  atu0.06 0.04  0.04  9 0.02  actual/  0.02  ___  0.04
0  t  . b  {  ----d---ft  ecast  0  _  _ ,0  forecat  0
N,:P Nqq  N-,  N4  N,  Ncp  Ncp  ,:P  cp  N(P  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2059 Financial  Intermediation  and Growth: Ross  Levine  February  1999  K. Labrie
Causality  and Causes  Norman  Loayza  31001
Thorsten  Beck
WPS2060 The Macroeconomics  of Delayed  Daniel  Kaufmann  February  1999  D. Bouvet
Exchange-Rate  Unification:  Theory  Stephen  A. O'Connell  35818
And Evidence  from Tanzania
WPS2061  A Framework  for Regulating  Hennie  van Greuning  February  1999  A. Thornton
Microfinance  Institutions  Joselito  Gallardo  80409
Bikki Randhawa
WPS2062 Does  Financial  Reform Increase  Oriana  Bandiera  February  1999  A. Yaptenco
or Reduce  Savings?  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  38526
Patrick  Honohan
Fabio  Schiantarelli
WPS2063 The  Practice  of Access  Pricing:  Tommasso  M. Valletti  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Telecommunications  in the United  36370
Kingdom
WPS2064 Regulating  Privatized  Rail  Transport  Javier  Campos  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Pedro  Cantos  36370
WPS2065 Exporting,  Externalities,  and  Howard  Pack  February  1999  C. Bernardo
Technology  Transfer  Kamal  Saggi  31148
WPS2066 Flight  Capital  as a Portfolio  Choice  Paul Collier  February  1999  A. Kitson-Walters
Anke  Hoeffler  33712
Catherine  Pattillo
WPS2067 Multinational  Firms and  Technology  Amy Jocelyn  Glass  February  1999  L.  Tabada
Transfer  Kamal  Saggi  36896
WPS2068  Quitting  and Labor  Turnover:  Tom Krebs  February  1999  T. Gomez
Microeconomic  Evidence  and  William F. Maloney  32127
Macroeconomic  Consequences
WPS2069 Logit  Analysis  in a Rotating  Panel  Patricio  Aroca Gonzalez  February  1999  T. Gomez
Context  and an Application  to  William F. Maloney  32127
Self-Employment  Decisions
WPS2070 The  Search  for the Key:  Aid,  David  Dollar  March  1999  E. Khine
Investment,  and Policies  in Africa  William Easterly  37471
WPS2071 The  World Bank's  Unified  Survey  Jos Verbeek  March  1999  M. Galatis
Projections:  How  Accurate  Are  31177
They?  An Ex-Post  Evaluation  of
US91-US97Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2072 Growth,  Poverty,  and Inequality:  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
A Regional  Panel  for Bangladesh  80425
WPS2073 Politics,  Transaction  Costs,  and  the  Antonio Estache  March  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Design  of Regulatory  Institutions  David  Martimort  36370
WPS2074  Light and Lightning  at the End of  Antonio Estache  March  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
the Public  Tunnel:  Reform  of the  Martin  Rodriguez-Pardina  36370
Electricity  Sector  in the Southern
Cone
WPS2075 Between  Group Inequality  and  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
Targeted  Transfers  80425
WPS2076 Microdeterminants  of Consumption,  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
Poverty,  Growth,  and Inequality  in  80425
Bangladesh
WPS2077 Change  in the Perception  of  the  Branko  Milanovic  March  1999  C. Argayoso
Poverty  Line during  Times  of  Branko  Jovanovic  33592
Depression:  Russia  1993-96
WPS2078 Valuing  Mortality  Reduction  in India:  Nathalie  B.  Simon  March  1999  T. Tourougui
A Study  of Compensationg-Wage  Maureen  L. Cropper  87431
Differentials  Anna  Alberini
Seema  Arora
WPS2079 Is More  Targeting  Consistent  with  Martin Ravallion  March 1999  P. Sader
Less Spending  33902
WPS2080  Monitoring  Targeting  Performance  Martin  Ravallion  March 1999  P. Sader
When Decentralized  Allocations  to  33902
the Poor  Are Unobserved
WPS2081 Reforming  C6te d'lvoire's  Cocoa  John McIntire  March  1999  P. Kokila
Marketing  and Pricing  System  Panos  Varangis  33716
WPS2082 Gross  Worker  and Job Flows  in a  John C. Haltiwanger  March  1999  S. Fallon
Transition  Economy:  An Analysis  Miian  Vodopivec  38009
of Estonia
WPS2083 INFRISK:  A Computer  Simulation  Mansoor  Dailami  March  1999  B. Nedrow
Approach  to Risk Management  in  llya Lipkovich  31585
Infrastructure  Project  Finance  John Van Dyck
Transactions
WPS2084 Future  Inequality  in Carbon  Dioxide  Mark  T. Heil  March 1999  C. Anguizola
Emissions  and the Projected  Impact  Quentin  T. Wodon  39230
of Abatement  Proposals